The Michigan Supreme Court ruled yesterday that the state's same-sex marriage amendment prevented public schools and universities from extending domestic partner benefits to same-sex couples. Waymon posted on this story yesterday, but I thought it deserved a second look because the ruling reveals important things about how courts decide what the law means.
The Michigan Amendment
Here's the exact language of the 2004 amendment to the Michigan constitution in relevant detail: "the union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union for any purpose.''
Opponents of the amendment argued that, among other things, the ban would do much more than block same-sex marriages or civil unions. It would also, they said, prevent the state from offering more limited rights and benefits to same-sex couples (or unmarried heterosexual couples): things like domestic partner benefits, medical decision-making rights, and protection under domestic violence laws.
While a few proponents of the ban acknowledged the possibility that the amendment would reach that far, most scoffed at the idea. The ban, they said, would only prevent same-sex couples from marrying or entering into a functionally equivalent legal relationship such as a civil union.
So far, so familiar. Anyone living in Indiana or Florida or Ohio or any of the other states where "marriage +" amendments have been debated knows this argument inside and out.
What we haven't known is how courts would interpret these amendments, because it usually takes several years for a case to work its way up from a trial court to the state's court of last resort. (That's the fancy technical term for a state's highest court. Why don't eggheads such as moi just call it a supreme court like everybody else? Because not all states have gotten the memo. New York, for example, calls its trial courts "supreme court," and calls its court of last resort the "Court of Appeals." Go figure.)
Now we've reached the point where two separate state courts of last resort have ruled on the reach of their states' same-sex marriage amendment.
The Ohio Supreme Court Ruling
The Ohio Supreme Court ruled last year that the marriage ban did not mean that unmarried couples could not be covered under the state's domestic violence laws. Here's the exact language of the Ohio amendment:
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized by this state and its political subdivisions. This state and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage.
An Ohio law on domestic violence specifically protected people "living as a spouse" and the question before the court was whether the "living as a spouse" provision violated the constitution because it recognized a legal status for relationships of unmarried couples that approximated the "design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage."
The Ohio court ruled that the domestic violence law was constitutionally kosher. Specifically, it held that "the second sentence of the amendment means the state cannot create or recognize a legal status for unmarried persons that bears all of the attributes of marriage -- a marriage substitute" (emphasis added).
So in other words, a law treating unmarried couples as though they were married for just one specific purpose (in this case domestic violence) doesn't violate the constitution. A law would have to treat unmarried couples as married for all legal purposes of marriage in order to violate the constitution.
What the Ohio Supreme Court ruled, in effect, was that the marriage amendment only banned married and separate-but-equal equivalents, such as civil union.
The Michigan Supreme Court Ruling
With me so far? Good. Now let's turn to the Michigan Supreme Court.
That court took a distinctly different approach to reading the state's marriage ban, even though the language of the Ohio and Michigan amendments seem sort of similar. (If anything, the Ohio amendment seems broader in scope than the Michigan one.)
According to the Michigan Supreme Court, "[a] union does not have to possess all the same legal rights and responsibilities that result from a marriage in order to constitute a union "similar" to that of marriage. . . . the pertinent question is not whether these unions give rise to all the same legal effects; rather, it is whether these unions are being recognized as unions similar to marriage for any purpose" [emphasis added.]
You may be forgiven for thinking "WTF? How can two different state high courts come up with two such radically different interpretations of amendments that sound pretty similar?"
The one dissenting justice in the Michigan case was equally perplexed. "It is an odd notion to find that a union that shares only one of the hundreds of benefits that a marriage provides is a union similar to marriage," Justice Kelly said.
But the majority argued that all it was doing was interpreting what it saw as the plain meaning of the words. "[O]ur responsibility is, as it has always been in matters of constitutional interpretation, to determine the meaning of the amendment's actual language."
The curious part is that this is exactly what the Ohio Supreme Court said it was doing as well: interpreting the meaning of the amendment's actual language.
Judges Are Just Humans
And that's what we expect courts to do: figure out the meaning of the laws and rule accordingly. The problem is that those meanings aren't always clear and that different judges can come to different conclusions about what a law means, and what it requires. That's why appellate court decisions often have dissenting opinions--because the judges deciding the case legitimately disagree about what a law means, and/or what it requires.
That doesn't make some judges good and others evil. It makes them all human, struggling to understand and interpret laws written by other humans, who have multiple motivations for writing those laws in the first place. Laws that are easy to understand pretty much never make it past the trial courts. It's the complicated laws, ones admitting to multiple possible interpretations that make it to the high courts in the first place. It's no surprise that the amendments that simply limit marriage to heterosexual couples aren't the ones being litigated. Everybody knows what those laws mean.
Here in Indiana, nobody was arguing over the meaning of the first clause of SJR-7, the proposed same-sex marriage amendment that didn't make it out of the legislature. It simply limited marriage to one man and one woman. It was the second clause of amendment, the "marriage +" part, that got all the attention, because people legitimately disagreed about what it meant. And lemme tell you, if we're not clear about a law's meaning, it's not going to be clear to judges either. Different judges in different states will come to different conclusions.
In the instances at hand, that means same-sex couples in Ohio got lucky while same-sex couples in Michigan didn't.
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Thanks for this in-depth look at the ruling, Ellen.
Waymon Hudson | May 8, 2008 5:33 PM
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Thank you.
Now we know.
FatherFaggot | May 8, 2008 5:52 PM
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So the next course of action in Michigan is to take something else that is widely established as part of marriage and void it's ability to be used by anyone other than a spouse.
So what should be targetted to show the absurdity of this?
Maybe something that affects heterosexuals as well? Any ideas? It's late and my mind's drawing a blank.
beergoggles | May 8, 2008 11:33 PM
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Joint credit cards
Joint checking accounts
Robert Ganshorn | May 9, 2008 5:21 AM
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Thanks, Ellen. Your cutting through the often heavy "legaleeze" of the Michigan and Ohio decisions themselves gave an excellent picture of the logic (or what passed for it in some instances)the judges used. And you're right....despite the principled platitudes about ours being a government of laws, not of men, human beings put on robes, and their reasoning circuitry hasn't all been programmed with exactly the same interpretive software.
I'd mildy quibble (perhaps amplify is a better term) one thing you said:
"Here in Indiana, nobody was arguing over the meaning of the first clause of SJR-7, the proposed same-sex marriage amendment that didn't make it out of the legislature. It simply limited marriage to one man and one woman."
'Tis true that for the most part, the focus in Indiana was on the second, and not the first sentence. However, somewhat later in the fight against the measure, I came across some Congressional testimony by Georgetown University law professor Michael Siedman, who had pointed out that an almost identical sentence in the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment was susceptable of more than one reasonable meaning. In particular he cited the earlier testimony of Notre Dame law professor Gerard Bradley, who dissented from other "conservative" colleagues in believing that the first sentence also banned full legislated civil unions, something that Indiana proponents vigorously denied. Another of his colleagues from Princeton whose name escapes me right now joined in publicly expressing that dissenting view. We used this to argue that, contrary to proponent's claims that the language was clear, even the legal community on the other side thought otherwise. But of course that just reinforces what you've said about judges being human beings.
One other point concerning how judges go about figuring out what laws or constitutional amendments mean: The states have developed somewhat different judicial tests concerning how much evidence outside of the words themselves they will consider, particularly when those words susceptible of more than one reasonable meaning (in and of itself often the subject of disagreement). In Michigan, although the dissent strongly disagreed, the majority refused to look at the fact that most proponents of its amendment had taken out ads telling the public that it would have no impact on domestic partnership benefits for same-sex couples.
So, as you imply, if you want to optimize the chances for the judges to interpret something the same as you do, you go the extra mile to say that in the words themselves. That is if you really want them to do that. I believe that a significant number of proponents of "marriage protection amendments" argue clarity while secretly preserving fuzziness so that they can say one thing before passage, and quite another to the courts afterwards.
Don Sherfick | May 9, 2008 7:24 AM
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I've sent this on to others who would find it interesting. :) Great post!
Bil Browning | May 9, 2008 12:28 PM
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Ellen,
You said,
"It's no surprise that the amendments that simply limit marriage to heterosexual couples aren't the ones being litigated. Everybody knows what those laws mean."
Actually, even that language isn't so clear. For example, one could easily argue that the words "woman" and "man" refer not to biological sex, but to gender identity or expression, since if the former was intended, the drafters would have said "female" and "male." Such an interpretation would, of course, open up civil marriage to fully-transitioned transsexuals and, thus, legitimize marriages that New Jersey has said are legal, but Kansas and Texas say are not.
Even if those words are intended to refer to biological females and males, the assumption that it is easy to determine whether a particular person is one or the other is an illusion. As the cases involving marriages involving transsexuals illustrate, the medical profession uses a number of factors, not just chromosomes or genitalia, to determine the sex of a person, and even chromosomes and genitalia can lead to inclusive results in the case of intersex persons, such as women with Complete Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome who have XY chromosomes but are entirely female in appearance (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Androgen_insensitivity). The presence of such cases, in my mind, leaves even the solely "one man and one woman" marriage amendments open to challenge on the grounds that they are void for vagueness, since the difficulty of applying them in any given case leaves them open to arbitrary enforcement. (Of course, there is also the question of whether a post-SRS MTF transsexual who is biologically nearly indistinguishable from a cisgender woman who has had a hysterectomy (only the presence of a prtostate gland in the former distinguishes them) should be considered to be female or should, instead, be treated as male solely on the basis of what it says on her birth certificate, as the Texas and Kansas courts have held.)
Hopefully, when the right case comes along, someone will make these arguments and we will all see where they fall out. Of course, the simpler solution would be to make marriage available to every couple that loves each other and wants to participate in that institution, but, in the current climate, it doesn't look like that's going to happen any time soon.
Abby (a frustrated trans attorney who thinks thed world has better things to worry about than whether two people who love each other should be allowed to marry)
Abby | May 9, 2008 12:34 PM
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It's important to note, I think, that even though the Ohio Supreme Court did, eventually, certify that applying domestic violence laws to unmarried couples was "kosher" between the initial appeal and the Supreme Court ruling, there was a period of limbo in which unmarried people in 33 Ohio counties were not able to get protection from abuse orders nor have their unmarried partners arrested for unwitnessed abusive acts.
When district appeals courts suspended DV protections to unmarried people because of a few criminal cases, they left millions of Ohioans open to danger with limited ability to meaningfully protect themselves through legal means.
There is no way to quantify how many people were injured or perhaps even died while waiting for the Supreme Court to hear the case. It is chilling to imagine what could have happened if the Supreme Court ruling had gone the other way, which it very easily could have.
More importantly, that same legal argument can (and probably will) be used again in another state with a similarly worded amendment, perhaps even just as a "test case" but the unforeseen (unconsidered?) consequences are grave.
Dreama | May 9, 2008 4:34 PM
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